NIESG: Nagoya International Economics Study Group

NIESG: 名古屋国際経済研究会

NIESG: Nagoya International Economics Study Group


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更新日 2012-06-26 | 作成日 2008-07-16


  日時 2012年12月1-2日(土、日)
  場所 未定(新潟大学または新潟県内の施設)


  日時 2012年6月16日(土)13:00-18:10
  場所 釧路公立大学(107教室)LinkIcon釧路公立大学アクセス


第一部 座長 近藤 健児 氏(中京大学経済学部)

第1報告 13:00 - 14:10
講演者:水田 浩之 氏(釧路公立大学経済学部)
題目:Lowered Beachhead Cost
要旨:In a model with fixed costs heterogeneity ala Kikuchi (1996), however, with Hopenhayn mechanism plugged into it like Meritz (2003), gains from trade and the effects of decreasing fixed trade costs on each firms are examined. Furthermore, I show variety curves as in Kukichi, under this paper's setting. Contrasting with Kikuchi, however, I couldn't obtain the rising variety supply curve, but only a flat one. Lowering fixed trade costs increase the share of firms who approve of opening trade, which implies that it might make the appeal of an interest group of firms to the government stronger, making it easy for it to have the government open the economy against the trade with foreign countries.

第2報告 14:10 - 15:20
講演者:濱田 弘潤 氏(新潟大学経済学部)
題目:Habit Formation and the Transfer Paradox in an Overlapping Generations Model(篠崎剛氏(東北学院大学経済学部)・柳原光芳氏(名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科)との共著)
要旨:This paper examines the transfer problem between two countries when either a donor or a recipient has habit formation in a one-sector overlapping generations model. As is well-known, in taking a model with habit formation into consideration, we need to check whether the dynamic stability conditions are satisfied with regard to the capital and the previous consumption that affects the current consumption as a habit formation. We elucidate that when either a donor or a recipient has habit formation, any additional conditions are not required in order to satisfy the dynamic stability conditions. This is in a stark contrast with the result that when both a donor and a recipient have habit formation, an additional condition to satisfy the dynamic stability conditions is required. We demonstrate that when a donor country with habit formation has higher savings compared to a recipient country, a strong transfer paradox, in which the donor country is enriched and the recipient country is immiserized, is possible to occur in the situation wherein any transfer paradox does not occur without habit formation. Moreover, we show that a weak transfer paradox in which both countries are immiserized is possible to occur. These findings suggest that the high degree of habit formation for the donor can explain the motivation to voluntarily give a transfer.


第二部 座長 柳瀬 明彦 氏(東北大学大学院国際文化研究科)

第三報告 15:40-16:50
講演者:吉見 太洋 氏(南山大学経済学部)
題目:A Small Open Economy Model for ASEAN Countries: Spread Shocks and Exchange Rate Arrangements
要旨:We investigate the welfare implications of monetary arrangements in ASEAN countries with a small open economy model, considering the effects of interest rate spread shocks. We find that a country benefits from adopting a fixed exchange rate regime when the bond rate spread shock brings about macroeconomic volatility. Further, we examine ASEAN countries and find that, in our baseline investigation, prevailing choices of exchange rate arrangements in ASEAN countries are consistent with our welfare criterion. We also find that higher trade openness and lower persistence of the domestic productivity shock improve the advantage of the fixed exchange rate arrangements.


第四報告 17:00-18:10
講演者:川端 康 氏(名古屋私立大学大学院経済学研究科)
題目:Regional Agreements on Standards: Multilateralism versus Regionalism (with Yasuhiro Takarada)
要旨:The purpose of this paper is to consider the effects of regional and multilateral agreements on standards in a three-country model of trade. We show that multilateral agreement on standards makes member countries better off relative to regional agreement. However, it may make an excluded country worse off relative to regional agreement. Therefore, regional agreement hampers the incentive of the excluded country to support multilateral agreement.

懇親会 Restaurant & Community Iomante LinkIcon会場HP


  日時   2012年3月5日(月)
  場所   中京大学名古屋キャンパス


第1報告 13:00 - 14:00
講演者:松原 聖 氏(日本大学商学部)
題目:Home-Market and Cost Effects of International Product-Quality Allocation
要旨:This paper analyzes the behavior of firms serving its products to two countries. The main focus of this paper is on how the product-quality choice in different markets are related with the cost structure of the firm and market conditions. About the cost structure, costs depending on quantity and quality (“production costs”) and those depending only on quality (“R&D costs”) are discussed. This paper examines the effects of production and R&D costs on the product quality in the monopoly markets separately, and then discusses two general cases: (1) two firms from different developed countries enter the developing-country market and (2) downward-sloping demand curve assuming a distribution of consumers in each country. This paper shows that if the effects of production costs or the home-market dominate, providing different levels of product quality is optimal and that if the effects of R&D costs or the developing-market dominate, providing!
the common level of quality is optimal.

第2報告 14:00 - 15:00
講演者:都丸 善央 氏(中京大学経済学部)
題目:Why do developing countries have state trading enterprises?
要旨:本研究では、途上国に存在する国家貿易企業(STEs)が持つ貿易政策としての効果について輸入小国モデルを用いて分析する。多くの途上国は消費者価格維持を目的としてSTEsを設立している。しかしながら、それは自由貿易の下でも十分達成可能であり、途上国政府がSTEsを保有する別の目的があることを示唆していると言える。そこで、本研究では、STEsが利潤非負条件の下で消費者余剰最大化を目指して消費者価格を決定する一方で、政府は国内生産者の利潤に偏向を持つ社会厚生の最大化を目指して生産者価格を決定する、というモデルを考えた。そこから得られた結果は、(1) 国内生産者に対する偏向があまり大きくない限り自由貿易や最適関税政策よりもSTEs設立の方が政府にとっては望ましい、(2) 政府が先に生産者価格を決定する場合には、財政収支均衡を維持しつつ両価格について自分の目的最大化する状況を偽装できる、ということである。


*第三報告 15:20-16:20
講演者:古川 雄一 氏(中京大学経済学部)
題目:Knowledge Spillovers and Perpetual Leapfrogging in International Competition


*第四報告 16:30-17:30
講演者:東田 啓作 氏(関西学院大学経済学部)
題目:What Should Exporting Countries of Secondhand Goods Do for the Effective Trade Restriction of Hazardous Wastes?
要旨:This paper examines trade restriction of secondhand goods according to the date of manufacture and monitoring on illegal trade. We assume that (a) the home (the foreign) country exports (imports) secondhand goods, and (b) the recycling/dismantling process in the foreign country generates greater environmental pollution than that in the home country does. First, we show that the first-best situation cannot be achieved by setting trade restriction so that the marginal benefit is equal to the social marginal cost for legal trade. Then, we demonstrate that given the level of trade restriction, the monitoring frequency of the home country is necessarily smaller than the world optimum, while that of the foreign country can be either insufficient or excessive. Moreover, we found that trade restriction chosen by the foreign country may be stricter than the world optimum. In such a case, it is important for the home country to commit itself to increase the monitoring frequency.


*第五報告 17:40-18:40
講演者:大川 隆夫 氏(立命館大学経済学部)
題目:Regional Location and Social Inefficiency in Service Industries
要旨:We evaluate firm location in a service industry with location choice from the welfare perspective. We focus on the situation where firms locate in either of two regions with different marginal costs and fixed entry costs. We show that the equilibrium location can be efficient, excessive (i.e., too large), or insufficient (i.e., too small) in each region, depending on the difference in fixed cost. In particular, under some condition, firms excessively locate in the inefficient region with high marginal and fixed entry costs.



  日時   12月17日(土)-18日(日)
  場所   草津 ホテル中澤ヴィレッジ会議室 


<12月17日> 13:00- 参加申込

第1部 座長 松原 聖 氏 (日本大学)

第1報告 14:30-16:00
講演者 太田代(唐澤) 幸雄 氏 (南山大学)
題目  "Population Aging, Fertility, and International Trade Pattern within a Heckscher-Ohlin Framework (joint with Akihiko Yanase)"
要旨  TBA


第2報告 16:20-17:50
講演者  濱田 弘潤 氏 (新潟大学)
題目   "Altruism and the Transfer Paradox in an OLG Model (joint with Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara)"

要旨   This paper examines the transfer problem between two countries when both a donor and a recipient have the altruistic utility in a one-sector OLG model. We demonstrate that a strong form of the transfer paradox, in which the donor country is enriched and the recipient country is immiserized, never occurs. Any transfer cannot enrich a donor even if the donor is highly altruistic, whilst a transfer may immiserize a recipient if the recipient is highly altruistic. This result suggests that high altruism of the donor cannot explain the motivation to voluntarily make a transfer.

19:00- 懇親会

第2部 座長 川端 康 氏 (名古屋市立大学)

第3報告 9:00-10:30
講演者  柳瀬 明彦 氏 (東北大学)
題目   "Policy Reform in an Polluted Small Open Economy with Tourism"
要旨   TBA

会計報告 10:30- 藤井 孝宗 氏 (高崎経済大学)


  日時   10月1日(土) 13:00-18:20
  場所   沖縄大学 3号館 3-102教室 


第1部 座長 松原 聖 氏 (日本大学)

第1報告 13:00-14:10
講演者 吉見 大洋 氏 (南山大学)
題目  "The Cost Channel and Exchange Rate Systems"
要旨  This paper investigates the role of the cost channel in the choice of exchange rate systems with a two-country model with financial intermediary. We compare macroeconomic stability and the properties of the international transmission of business cycles under three exchange rate systems, a flexible (FLEX), monetary union (MU) and a unilateral peg (PEG). When the firms finance limited parts of their operational costs from the commercial bank, or the cost channel is weak, macroeconomic volatility is highest under FLEX. This is because stabilization in the nominal exchange rate helps to stabilize other macro variables under MU and PEG. We assume the central bank in a monetary union follows a Taylor rule with inflation and output in both countries, thus, volatility becomes higher under PEG than MU. On the other hand, when the firms finance all their operational costs from the commercial bank, or the cost channel is strong, FLEX becomes the regime that realizes the lowest volatility. Responses in inflation and other variables to disturbances are amplified through the cost channel. Under FLEX, the central banks in each country controls the policy rates against the fluctuation in their own inflation and output. The choice of exchange rate system significantly depends on the existence of the cost channel.

第2報告 14:10-15:20
講演者  都丸 善央 氏 (中京大学)
題目   "Does Trade Liberalization Improve Public Firm's Productive Efficiency?"

要旨   This paper studies how a tariff reduction influences the productive efficiency of a public firm competing against a private firm, by focusing on the public firm's incentive to make cost-reducing R&D investment. It is shown that if a tariff reduction induces a foreign firm to enter into the domestic market wherein public monopoly prevails, the public firm's productive efficiency deteriorates dramatically. However, subsequent trade liberalization steadily improves the efficiency. Furthermore, it is also shown that efficiency under trade liberalization can be higher than that under public monopoly, depending on the curvature of the public firm's reaction curve and demand curve.

(コーヒーブレイク 20分)

第2部 座長 近藤 健児 氏 (中京大学)

第3報告 15:40-16:50
講演者  増田 淳矢 氏 (中京大学)
題目   "Probit-VARモデルの推定法の提案と為替介入への応用"
要旨   本論文ではProbit-VARモデルの推定法の提案を行う。Probit-VARモデルは二項選択(もしくは多項選択)モデルを利用したVARモデルである。既存のVARモデルでは質的変数を被説明変数にすることができなかったが、本論文ではその方法ついて論じている。このモデルの利点は質的データの時系列分析をすることが可能であり、本論文ではこのモデルを応用して為替介入の効果の分析を行っている。

(コーヒーブレイク 20分)

第4報告 17:10-18:20
講演者  川端 康 氏 (名古屋市立大学)
題目   "Standards and Free Trade Agreement"
要旨   TBA

19:00-  懇親会



  日時   7月23日(土) 15:30-18:10
  場所   名古屋学院大学日比野学舎 5階501教室

第1報告 15:30-16:40
講演者 杉山 泰之 氏(福井県立大学)
題目  "Special Economic Zones, Urban Unemployment and Environmental Protection (with and Muneyuki Saito)"
要旨  We examine environmental and economic influences from the formation of special economic zone (SEZ) and stricter pollution control in the economy with urban unemployment of Harris-Todaro type. We suppose in our model that pollution is discharged from urban manufacturing and SEZ sectors, and the government sets the maximum allowable pollution level. We, then, show that, in contrast to Chaudhuri and Adhikari (1993), the formation of SEZ mitigates unemployment rate even if domestic capital can move between urban and rural sectors, and the price of pollution permits is lower than marginal environmental damage in the situation where the optimal level of pollution allowance is attained. Moreover, we confirm that an establishment of the SEZ may stiffen the optimal level of pollution allowance.


第2報告 17:00-18:10
講演者  市田 敏啓 氏(早稲田大学)
題目   TBA
要旨   TBA

18:30-  懇親会



  日時   5月7日(土) 14:00-18:20
  場所   中京大学5号館2階 521教室 

第1報告 14:00-15:00
講演者 小川 健 氏(名古屋大学)
題目  "International Trade and Optimal Management of Shared Renewable Resource (with Yasuhiro Takarada and Weijia Dong)"
要旨  本論文では、国際的に共有される再生可能資源の管理と国際貿易について分析をしている。管理費用に見合う実行可能な管理方法として最も望ましいといわれているのは、産出管理である。産出管理とは、再生可能資源の産出量を直接規制するものである。河川の水や地下水などの取水制限、野生動物の捕獲頭数の制限、水産物の総漁獲量制限が代表的な例である。複数国で共有する資源の場合、1国だけでの資源管理は効果がほとんどないため、国際協調が資源管理には不可欠である。回遊性魚類のマグロなどの水産資源は、沿岸の関係国がそれぞれ漁獲可能量の上限を設定して資源を保護・管理している。近年の貿易自由化の進展で、資源の国際貿易は拡大の一途で、中でも資源管理が困難な国際的に共有される再生可能資源の減少が懸念されている。我々は国際貿易が各国の資源管理や資源水準、経済厚生に与える影響を2国2財一般均衡モデルで分析する。主な結果は以下の3点である。第一に、自給自足経済において、ある1国が一方的に資源管理を実施すると、相手国はそれにより利益を得る。また、資源管理がないオープンアクセスの状態から、一方的に僅かに資源管理を実施する場合は、相手国だけでなく資源管理の実施国も得をする。第二に、両国が資源管理を行っている下で貿易を開始すると、資源財の輸出国は定常状態で貿易利益を得るが、資源財の輸入国は定常状態で貿易損失を被る可能性がある。第三に、世界の経済厚生を最大化する最善の資源管理を実施したときの資源水準は、資源の自然回復力が最も高いMSY(最大持続生産量)を達成する資源水準よりも高いことが明らかとなった。

第2報告 15:00-16:00
講演者  東田 啓作 氏(関西学院大学)
題目   "When Do Governments Mislead Home Consumers? (With Keisuke Hattori)"
要旨   This paper examines the incentive of the government to mislead home consumers, and investigates the effects of misinformation on the profit of the home producer, the home consumer surplus, and home and world welfare. We find that the government chooses the positive (resp. negative) amount of misinformation on the home (resp. foreign) product, which means that the government induces consumers to perceive the quality of the home (resp. foreign) product higher (resp. lower) than it truly is, although the positive (resp. negative) misinformation decreases (resp. increases) the consumer surplus. We also find that the government is likely to prefer to disparage the foreign product rather than to praise the home product when the consumption amounts are large, and when the difference between the price and the marginal cost is small. Moreover, we demonstrate that, the more liberalized the trade is, the stronger incentive the government has to mislead home consumers particularly by disparaging the foreign product.

第3報告 16:20-17:20
講演者  近藤 健児 氏(中京大学)
題目   "International Integration with Heterogenous Immigration Policies (with Nicola Coniglio)"
要旨   Increasing economic integration between countries has been accompanied by a process of integration and harmonization of common and uniform rules in many policy areas. Immigration policies have been largely untouched by this process, in fact also in area of the world (such as the European Union) where a high degree of policy centralization and integration has taken place, countries still preserve full autonomy on deciding who, how many and under which conditions third-country individuals might cross their border in order to live and work. The aim of this paper is to investigate some of the welfare consequences associated to the existence of heterogeneous and uncoordinated immigration policy in an interconnected world. We build a simple three country model where two rich countries with different immigration policies form a federation and receive immigrants from a third developing country. We show the existence of strong immigration policy externalities; a more restrictive immigration policy in one country might reduce or increase welfare in the other country. In addition we consider the effects of economic integration within the federation in the form of free mobility of native workers. We show that labor market integration might lead to loose-loose situations in case of large displacement of immigration from the third country.

第4報告 17:20-18:20
講演者  島田 章 氏(長﨑大学)
題目   "Wage Inequality and Human Capital Formation"
要旨   We investigate the effects of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers on human capital formation in a home country and their incentive for emigration when some of the workers in the home country can be accepted in a foreign country. Unlike the previous analyses on brain drain and brain gain, we pay attention to the fact that resources for human capital formation, such as education, are not necessarily supplied elastically and free. To take this fact into account, we include a resource market, i.e. the education market and consider transactions of education explicitly. We show that both skilled and unskilled workers in the home country always attempt to migrate even if they are less likely to be accepted in the foreign country. We also show that brain gain and brain drain take place simultaneously in the home country. In particular, if wage inequality is larger in the foreign country than in the home country, skilled workers in the home country experience brain gain, whereas unskilled workers in the home country experience brain drain. In contrast, if wage inequality is larger in the home country, skilled workers experience brain drain, whereas unskilled workers experience brain gain. Our results suggest that the effects of migration possibilities on human capital formation of different types of workers are affected by differences in wage inequality between the home and foreign countries and that the home country’s future wage inequality might be affected by the host country’s present wage inequality.

18:30- 懇親会